Centre for Democracy, Development and Culture in Africa

ANNUAL REPORT 2020

Building collaborative partnerships to promote peaceful and secure communities in Africa
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Building collaborative partnerships to promote peaceful and secure communities in Africa
2020 in pictures
# Table of contents

List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................6
About Gorée Institute ................................................................................................7
I. REVIEW OF PROGRESS IN 2020 ........................................................................10
II. Programme overview ..........................................................................................14
    A. GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES ........................................... 15
    B. Consolidation de la Paix et Prévention des Conflits .........................................33
III. Strategic partnerships .......................................................................................50
    1. Programme "Power of Dialogue" - PoD 2021-2025 ...........................................50
    2. The Charter Project Africa - CPA 2021-2023 ....................................................51
IV. TERAL: Instrument d’autofinancement du Gorée Institute ...............................54
V. Financial Statements ...........................................................................................56
VI. Perspectives and institutional challenges ..........................................................58
VII. Partners in 2020 ...............................................................................................60
VIII. Publications ....................................................................................................62
IX. Conseil d’administration ..................................................................................66
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDEG</td>
<td>African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance</td>
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<td>AGA</td>
<td>African Governance Architecture</td>
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<td>AGR</td>
<td>Income-generating activities</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>CEMI</td>
<td>Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies</td>
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<td>CENI</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>CIFOP</td>
<td>International Centre for Practical Training</td>
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<td>CNRA</td>
<td>Conseil National de Régulation de l’Audiovisuel</td>
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<td>CODEL</td>
<td>Convention of Civil Society Organisations for Domestic Election Observation</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Charter Project Africa</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
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<td>DWF</td>
<td>Democracy Works Foundation</td>
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<td>EPD</td>
<td>European Partnership for Democracy</td>
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<td>ECPDM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>FPACL</td>
<td>Fonds de Péréquation et d'Appui aux Collectivités Locales</td>
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<td>FSTP</td>
<td>Financial Support to Third Parties</td>
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<td>GORIN</td>
<td>Gorée Institute</td>
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<td>GPPAC</td>
<td>Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>GRM</td>
<td>Mineral Resources Governance</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Industries Chimiques du Sénégal</td>
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<td>IGD</td>
<td>Democratic Governance Initiatives</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>NIMD</td>
<td>Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<td>OIP</td>
<td>Public Interest Organisation</td>
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<td>OSC</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>OSIWA</td>
<td>Open Society Initiative for West Africa</td>
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<td>OUA</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>PAI</td>
<td>Investment Action Plans (IAP)</td>
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<td>Small and medium-sized enterprises</td>
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<td>Small and Medium Industries</td>
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<td>Power of Dialogue</td>
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<td>RSE</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>Sabodala Gold Operations</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>African Union</td>
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<td>Cheikh Anta Diop University</td>
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<td>Union Européenne</td>
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About Gorée Institute

Gorée Institute was born on 25 June 1992, during a solemn ceremony presided over by His Excellency Mr. Abdou Diouf, President of the Republic of Senegal, backed up by Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). A group of Africans dedicated to the ideals of progress, justice and freedom, with a strong belief in cooperation and self-reliance, initiated the establishment of Gorée Institute.

The proposal for the Institute, first made by President Abdou Diouf, came during the famous Dakar Meeting for Democracy in South Africa, organised in 1987 by the then exiled African National Congress (ANC) leaders and a group of progressive and liberal Afrikaners. This meeting, funded by the Danielle Mitterrand Foundation and the Soros Foundation, was attended and backed up by Africans from other parts of the continent and contributed significantly to the establishment of democracy in South Africa in 1994: an African solution to an African problem.

Gorée Institute is an independent, pan-African Public Interest Organisation (PIO) with diplomatic status, which guarantees its integrity. Neither its independence nor its integrity is negotiable: the pan-African Board of Directors in its composition is the repository of the organisation’s authority and decision-making power.

VISION

Gorée Institute works towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous Africa, more present on the international scene, with engaged societies, strong institutions and open and self-reliant citizens, with democratic and efficient states, prosperous and transparent businesses and an independent and engaged civil society.

MISSION

Our mission is to promote the emergence of fair, peaceful and self-reliant societies in Africa. We do this by striving to expand the range of paradigms, tools, skills and knowledge that can promote the emergence of peaceful and self-reliant societies. To this end, we also build the capacity of the institutions and individuals that constitute these societies and work towards their establishment. In doing so, we optimise the use of the continent’s human, creative and financial resources, while harnessing and adapting best practices from elsewhere.

VALUES

The dedication of all staff to the Institute and its mission is our greatest asset. Innovation, creativity, critical thinking and participation in action networks are our core values, skills and activities.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Through research, facilitation and intervention, the Institute aims to:

▪ The strengthening of political dialogue and the consolidation of peace
▪ Conflict prevention as well as support to individuals and institutions working at national, sub-regional and regional levels to develop an effective solution to social and political problems
problems related to peacebuilding;

- Improving political governance and electoral processes;
- The enhancement of the continent’s human, artistic and economic creativity.

**OUR APPROACH**

Our programmes, activities and institutional identity are informed by three indispensable and interdependent elements: research, capacity building and intervention. Research enables us to promote intellectual and artistic production; as well as to foster a visionary and preventive approach to contemporary problems and challenges; capacity building on the basis of the knowledge generated to improve the skills and expertise of citizens, a necessary condition for future engagement; and intervention enables us to act often on the outcomes of the reflection and research phases for effective facilitation or advocacy. Gorée Institute does not adopt an activist approach. It is a facilitating and catalytic organisation based on the fundamental principle of the collaborative relationship.

**OUR FOCUS AREAS**

- Governance and electoral processes
- Media and conflict prevention
- Youth leadership and conflict prevention
- Leadership, women, peace and security
- Natural resource governance and conflict prevention
- Prevention of violent extremism.
I. REVIEW OF PROGRESS IN 2020

1. As part of its strategic vision, Goree Institute continues to position itself as a credible civil society organisation with a positive mindset to accompany ECOWAS efforts with its thematic expertise that promotes peace building, consolidation of democracy through transformative training, mediation coordination, advocacy and dialogue facilitation, as well as capacity building across the West African sub-region.

2. For the record, the year 2019 coincided with the end of a funding cycle and the adoption by the Board of the 2020-2023 Strategic Plan. Therefore, the main objective of Goree Institute’s management throughout 2020 was to establish a collaborative partnership to mobilise operational and strategic financial resources to ensure the organisational sustainability of Goree Institute. Operational means the ability to cover operating costs and ongoing projects for the year 2020 and strategic means planning ahead to secure funding for at least 2021-2023 in light of Goree Institute’s 2020-2023 strategy document.

3. Goree Institute was hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic that has spread around the world, resulting in both work continuity and social and financial challenges. Like many organisations, one of the main problems generated by the pandemic is the additional burden of fighting for recovery and the Institute’s raison d’être, combined with strong competition for limited resources as donors have become more restrained in their spending habits. Due to its duration and the fact that the pandemic has put Goree Institute at risk, one of the main decisions anticipated in this time of financial crisis was to put all staff on short-time working and, as a result, to reduce their take-home pay by 30% from May to November 2020. For their commitment and professionalism, the staff as a whole deserve special thanks.

4. Despite the COVID-19 which has heavily impacted the activities of TERAL, which usually provides 15-20% of Goree Institute’s annual budget and allows us to cover current expenses on an annual basis, Goree Institute has managed to obtain grants from Humanity United, Ford Foundation, OSIWA and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). These grants have enabled us to cover both project costs and running costs for the year 2020.

5. Therefore, during the year 2020, Goree Institute implemented research programmes, monitoring and regional policy dialogue roundtables in the field of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and also governance and policy mechanisms. The research series concerned the monitoring of citizens’ perception of natural resources in Senegal (monitoring, documentary films, animated graphics...), the monitoring of citizens’ perception of governance in Benin, the monitoring of institutional stability in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, political perspectives in the Sahel, societal values and the political system in Burkina Faso. In addition to these research activities, Goree Institute has successfully deployed field missions to Thiès, Matam and Kédougou, three major natural resource exploitation regions in Senegal, with the aim of strengthening community dialogues with local citizens in order to foster better, more inclusive and productive exchanges on important resource development issues at the local level.

6. Engaging in multi-stakeholder dialogue to assess democratic stability and peace in
Africa is a crucial element of Gorée Institute’s work. We believe that dialogues that bring together civil society actors, government agencies, community groups, political actors and regional institutions could reduce local conflicts, produce agreement and influence the priorities of governments or regional bodies, and strengthen stakeholder engagement in ways that address citizens’ needs for peace and stability. In this regard, despite the negative impact of COVID-19, Goree Institute successfully organised two regional roundtables in December 2020 on democratic stability as a solution for peacebuilding in West Africa and another on sharing best practices in natural resource governance in West Africa.

7. For the year 2021, a change is coming, and there is room for hope. Our funding strategy is to build strong partnerships with strong organisations to respond to calls for proposals from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the European Union (EU). This process took a whole year. As a result, Goree Institute managed to secure almost 80% of its annual budget for the period 2021-2025.

8. In addition, Gorée Institute, during the year 2020, updated its Code of Ethics and Integrity. The main novelty remains the integration in the Code of the function of Integrity Advisor. The aim is to prevent or mitigate possible damage at the earliest possible stage, both inside and outside the Institute, which may result from staff misconduct or errors in the system. On the basis of whistleblowing by employees, the Ethics and Integrity Advisor will act in the first instance as a mediator to follow up on all reported grievances and ensure that they are dealt with in a resolute and fair manner. The Ethics and Integrity Advisor submits an annual report, including: corruption and bribery, conflict of interest, misconduct (harassment or abuse of authority), misappropriation of funds, fraud and embezzlement, human rights violations, etc. Therefore, the Ethics and Integrity Advisor will act as an external mediator. The Ethics and Integrity Advisor is subject to a duty of confidentiality in all dealings with Gorée Institute and maintains confidentiality when receiving information.

9. In conclusion, with COVID-19 in 2020, all staff have experienced a challenging journey to change Goree Institute and mindsets with the ultimate goal of achieving greater sustainability and building new collaborative partnerships for peace and stability in Africa. In this regard, our top five priorities for the year 2021 are:

- Continue to build collaborative partnerships with credible institutions working in the field of democracy, governance, peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Africa.


- Mobilise resources to implement additional programmes in the area of democratic stability, peace and conflict prevention, with a focus on youth and women.

- Build staff capacity through recruitment and training for better performance and a more professional team.

- Continue to work to improve the Regional Strategic Plan 2021-2025 with specific and clear regional objectives, milestones and indicators, which can be used as a framework for regional activities and fundraising.

- Accentuate our capitalisation, communication and advocacy efforts, including the
launch of a visual identity, a website and a periodic newsletter, but also and especially the digital communication strategy.

10. Finally, the unfailing confidence of Gorée Institute's partners is crucial and will continue to propel the Institute in its role as a capacitating, facilitator and catalyst. This is therefore an opportunity to reiterate our gratitude to our funding partners, notably the Ford Foundation, OSIWA, Humanity United, NIMD, the European Union and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their strategic support to the Institute’s mission.
II. Programme overview

To say that our communities, organisations and institutions as a whole have been affected is an understatement. The COVID-19 pandemic has spared no country, no segment of society. The year 2020 was one of the most difficult periods for Gorée Institute since its inception. In the face of the health crisis, it was important for Gorée Institute to build resilience and thus adapt to the new global context by examining strategic and critical issues in our programmes, organisational structure and business perspectives.

On the programme side, the focus during 2020 was on developing strategic partnerships with the conceptualisation of new programmes under two Consortia, namely Power of Dialogue and Charter Project Africa. These partnerships should be a source of concrete and mutual added value, visible in the outcomes achieved in the pursuit of common goals and objectives, balanced against considerations of savings, costs and constraints.

In addition to the conclusion of strategic partnerships, Gorée Institute has been involved in the implementation of the following projects:

- Research project on social values and political systems in Burkina Faso
- Research project on political perspectives in the Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Senegal
- Project on monitoring institutional stability in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
- A Study on Citizens’ Sentiment on Governance in Benin
- A Study on Citizens’ Perception on the State of Democracy and Governance in Senegal
- Project on the governance of natural resources
- Project on the consolidation of democracy as a panacea for conflict prevention in West Africa and the Sahel
- Publication of a book on the state of democracy and human rights in West Africa

All projects carried out during 2020 were centred around two programme pillars carried out in West Africa, namely: Governance and Political Processes; and Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention. This was complemented by several partnership and advocacy activities, which greatly contributed to the consolidation of achievements despite a very difficult COVID-19 context and a year of transition. Research was by no means neglected, with the publication of six books that contributed to the production of knowledge.
A. GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

1. Regional meeting on democratic stability as a solution to peacebuilding in West Africa and the Sahel

The sub-regional meeting is a pretext for Goree Institute and its partners to contribute to the establishment of increased democratic space and inclusive, responsive and representative political decision-making at all levels, particularly in the Sahel geographical axis.

This overarching objective is closely linked to SDG 16, and in particular to 16.6 and 16.7. More specifically, it is about:

- examine the challenges to institutional stability at the sub-regional level with a particular focus on the Sahel geographical axis;
- examine in depth some emerging threats to political stability and justify the need to engage civic groups by proposing practical recommendations for ECOWAS and states;
- discuss strategic approaches to democratic stability as a path to peacebuilding;
- create a space to discuss how regional actors should foster partnership for peacebuilding and political stability in West Africa.

It should be recalled that West Africa is experiencing an upsurge of instability, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, Guinea Bissau and Togo. It has been shown that the political crisis in each of these countries has its origins in the lack of representation between citizens and leaders. To be optimal, governance must take into account the concerns of the various stakeholders in order to ensure sustainable development. It is in this sense that Gorée Institute brought together, from 15 to 16 December 2020, actors, analysts and experts from civil society, academia, the political sphere, African regional institutions and the donor community to contribute to providing relevant responses for democratic stability as a panacea for peacebuilding in West Africa. It should also be recalled that the creation of this framework for facilitating dialogue on the current situation in the ECOWAS region is aimed at promoting a peaceful democratic space and
inclusive, responsive and representative political decision-making at all levels.

The exchanges with all the participants from Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger focused on: the retrospection on the state of democracy in West Africa, the prospecton the future of democratic governance in West Africa and recommendations to ECOWAS, States and Civil Society Organisations.

- Looking back at the state of democracy in West Africa

The various analyses have emphasised the wobbling democracy and the impacts of instability in West Africa. Indeed, the establishment of democratisation processes in the ECOWAS region has taken several forms. It has been achieved either through consensual methods such as national conferences (Benin, Niger, etc.), transition by pacts (agreement between the actors) or transition by reforms. There is also a certain resistance to democratic transition through controlled transition (Togo, Mauritania, Nigeria, Burkina Faso) and snatched transition (Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.). In either case, we can agree with Julien Banda that the principles that go hand in hand with democracy are essentially adapted only to the state of peace and that “it is clear that respect for the rights of the individual in his quest for happiness, the ability to criticise his leaders, to control them, to dismiss them, the desire for absolute justice that is indifferent to circumstances, The State in West Africa is thus a delegative democracy in which the well tested political machinery gives pride to the holders of symbolic capital who play the role of stentors who are sure of their rights because they are legitimised by history and social representations. Overall, a partisan cordiality develops between the political formations that get along through an ‘interpartisan collusion’ and are thus transformed into agencies of the state. Traditional legitimacies are grafted onto this. In the face of Kafkaesque administrations and moloch states, violence is analysed ‘as an idiom of politics’ in view of the stakes involved in gaining and maintaining power. Moreover, political activity is widely perceived as a ‘political stash’ for the retribution of the elite.

It has been observed that democracy in West Africa is “suffering" due to the numerous conflicts and crises in the countries. Some authors also speak of an “old democracy" “in need of reform" or a "phoenix democracy", precisely in the case of Senegal. The same applies to institutional wear and tear (Mali), the inadequate environment for democratic change of power (elections, an inadequate guarantee of political change - Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger – Senegal is an exception), the failure to respect the principle of presidential term limits, and bad governance practices, the intrusion of the army into the political scene (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), strategies for retaining power (by manipulating candidacies in order to weaken potential successors, tightening up candidacies, sponsorship, guarantees, nationality of origin, age, etc.) criminal conviction -Niger Hama Amadou case; Senegal Khalifa SALL case and Karim Wade case, as well as through the technique of biased political change the same is true of the position of the political parties in the country, which is based on the principle of the “constitutional runner-up" and the “electoral runner-up".) The same applies to the ambiguous position of international partners in the preservation of democracy and the rule of law. In addition, there are democratic backlashes marked by a process of democratisation from above, a reductive conception of democracy (elections, institutional reforms) without taking into account economic and social development.

In addition, there is a state model in question (the historical nature of the state in Africa is obscured) and a failure to take into account social dynamics.

But for all the participants in the regional meeting, it is important to specify that this crisis of democracy in Africa goes beyond continental borders. The democratic model, whether procedural
or substantive, is in crisis almost everywhere in the world. While there is a “fairly broad consensus among academics and politicians that democracy as a practice is in decline”, there is no agreement on the factors that fuel people’s growing disenchantment with democracy. The impacts of democratic instability on the individual and collective situation of West African states are many and varied. On the peace, security, social cohesion and development of the states, if we agree on distrust, withdrawal or distancing, protest, the crisis of lasting loyalties, weak accountability and the low efficiency of public policies as markers of the fragility of democracy and good governance in Senegal, In Mali, Niger and Burkina, this regression and the rise of ‘growing cynicism’ (as Pippa Norris puts it) towards the regimes in place is leading to a deterioration of democratic participation, mainly articulated around electoral participation, party activism and civic engagement. As the “voice option” is still generally timid and not very effective in a context of democratisation that is still fragile and the failure of political and administrative institutions, the situation creates windows of criminality in which certain deviant categories of the population are swallowed up. This situation, if it gets bogged down, is a factor in irredentism, in the desire to change the established political, social and economic order through the alternative of the ‘exit option’ (Albert Hirschman) and therefore the questioning of peace and security. It is this critical scenario that should be feared because it is justified by the fragility of political and administrative institutions and therefore of the state apparatus.

With regard to the impact on human security, while the majority of local authorities in Senegal, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have a generally satisfactory environmental and political security situation, despite some misfortunes, the personal and community security situation is less favourable in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, where terrorist groups operate. In contrast to the other three countries (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), political security is rather good in Senegal, apart from the "low-intensity armed conflict" in Casamance and the recent development (still timid in several urban centres) of serious threats to peace and political stability.

- Exploring the future of democratic governance in West Africa

At this level, the participants in the regional meeting emphasised the ramp of democratic stability and the dividends of democratic stability.

Firstly, youth civic engagement is a catalyst for democratic stability and the preservation of peace in West Africa. The actions of youth in West Africa are determined by the political, social, economic and institutional contexts in which they operate. Indeed, the way in which they invest in democratic stability and the preservation of peace depends on their national history, the socio-political situation prevailing in their country, the degree of political and democratic freedom, but also the structuring of the political field, the degree of effectiveness of institutional responses, the state of social forces, etc.

Secondly, the programmatic action of civil society organisations and international partners constitutes a substantial contribution to that of the states. Indeed, in the face of the failure of states in most of its sectors of intervention, civil society organisations and partners help to fill the gaps in a perspective of co-production of public policies.

Thirdly, the relative democratic maturity of certain states, the anchoring of the institutions of the Republic and the level of awareness and civic commitment of the population generally act as a deterrent to any political will to go against the rules of democracy. In Niger, the establishment of a High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace to monitor peace agreements and the inclusion of
minorities is emblematic. One of the institution’s missions is to look for disparities between regions and to propose corrective measures to decision-makers to curb social and political exclusion.

The global dividend of democratic stability is the building of a modern and virtuous democracy, based on legitimate and efficient institutions, mobilising various initiatives, tending towards the building of a prosperous and peaceful nation that believes in its future. It can be articulated essentially around the two axes identified by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his agenda for peace: freedom from fear (peace and security) and freedom from want (development perspective).

More specifically, for West Africa, particularly Senegal, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, must take up the challenge of financing and rationalising political parties, ensuring the loyalty of political parties and controlling the worrying phenomenon of political nomadism. In addition, there is the depoliticisation of trade union’s freedom by public administration employees, which is a guarantee of the neutrality of the functioning of the public administration.

Democracy and the rule of law in West Africa also entail international challenges which, when met, will be important dividends. They are ‘like a necessary label on the international stage’. First, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance have serious limitations that affect its effective implementation on the continent. For example, in the event of a breach of the constitutional order, its binding sanctions are limited to individuals who are the perpetrators of these unconstitutional changes, as if its objective were exclusively devoted to the fight against coups d’état without the possibility of sanctions against more or less legitimate rulers who prevent democracy from being strengthened.

• **Recommendations to ECOWAS, States and Civil Society Organisations.**

The regional meeting was also an opportunity to create a space in which political and civic actors could collaborate, influence and participate in legitimate, transparent and accountable political processes, with a view to also fostering democratic stability. It also underscores the need to understand the current sub-regional reality and generate more systematic and holistic recommendations for further planning and intervention in peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

The major recommendations of the participants at the regional meeting included the following:

• **Recommendations to ECOWAS**
  - Ensure that States widely involve civil society actors in national warning centres;
  - Support States in the implementation of bilateral and regional security agreements;
  - Revise the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance to introduce stringent provisions on term limits and combat the practice of using the law to exclude candidates from elections;
  - Take positive actions for countries, like Mali, that are experiencing more difficulties in operationalising the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF);
  - Prioritise and highlight resilience actions that are the responsibility of the majority instead of being an after-the-fact reaction to violence that is more the concern of the minority;
  - Strengthen the financial, operational, institutional, etc. capacities of youth organisations

- **ANNUAL REPORT 2020**

- **Page 18**
engaged in the promotion of citizenship with a particular focus on citizen movements whose primary mission is to work for democratic stability and the preservation of peace;

- Identify "champions" among citizen movements involved in the preservation of peace and democratic stability and provide them with substantial support through optimal capacity building and appropriate institutional support;

- Encourage the establishment of inter-country platforms for peace in West Africa bringing together citizen movements and civil society organisations committed to the promotion of a culture of peace and the development of citizen engagement in West Africa;

- Prevent the intertwining of terrorist violence, intercommunal violence and political violence in polarised electoral contexts;

- Ensure coherence, immediate responses, short-term responses, medium-term responses and safeguarding the future (political consequences of impunity, local power struggles, choosing influential actors of the future).

- **Recommendations to the States**
  - Enhance transparency and participation in the management of natural resources;
  - Strengthen internal and cross-border security by fully engaging in the realisation of bilateral and sub-regional security cooperation initiatives;
  - Combine the fight against terrorism and access to media information;
  - Prioritise and highlight resilience actions that are the responsibility of the majority instead of confining Oneself to a posture of after-the-fact reaction to violence that rather concerns the minority;
  - Strengthen the financial, operational, institutional, etc. capacities of youth organisations engaged in the promotion of citizenship with a particular focus on citizen movements whose primary mission is to work for democratic stability and the preservation of peace;
  - Strengthen the financial, operational, institutional, etc. capacities of youth organisations engaged in the promotion of citizenship with a particular focus on citizen movements whose primary mission is to work for democratic stability and the preservation of peace;
  - Identify "champions" among citizen movements committed to the preservation of peace and democratic stability and provide them with substantial support through optimal capacity building and appropriate institutional support;
  - Encourage the political participation of youth by developing mentoring programmes for youth involved in political parties and citizen movements;
  - Establish or guarantee the basis for restoring democratic trust between the people and institutions;
  - Promote transparency in political, economic and social governance;
  - Strengthen the control bodies (CNRA, CENI, Constitutional Court, etc.);
  - Create a space for freedom and contradictory debates (vitality to democracy,
opposition, democratisation of media and information, political parties);

- Prevent the interweaving of terrorist violence, inter-communal violence and political violence in polarised electoral contexts;

- Ensure coherence, immediate responses, short-term responses, medium-term responses and safeguarding the future (political consequences of impunity, local power struggles, choosing influential actors of the future);

- Exclude the President of the Republic from the presidency of the Superior Council of the Judiciary for a better distribution of justice;

**Recommendations to Civil Society Organisations**

- Propose effective and lasting solutions to the structural causes of poverty that breed instability and violence;

- Support youth in preventing violence and promoting a culture of tolerance and intercultural and inter-religious dialogue;

- Encourage the political participation of youth by developing mentoring programmes for youth involved in political parties and citizen movements;

- Take ownership of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) evaluation reports and help popularise them;

- Become more involved in early warning and preventive diplomacy;

- Enhance advocacy for transparency in natural resource governance and engage in related dispute resolution;

- Enhance advocacy for the consolidation of the rule of law in the context of the fight against terrorism;

- Create a space for freedom and contradictory debates (vitality to democracy, opposition, democratisation of media and information, political parties).

- Advocating for the strengthening of control bodies (CNRA, CENI, Constitutional Court, etc.);

- Advocacy for transparency in political, economic and social governance

The publication of this study is available at Gorée Institute and on the website www.goreeinstitut.org

2. Political perspectives in the Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Senegal

The idea of contributing to the achievement of peace and stability in the West African region in general and in the Sahel in particular, through the production of an institutional monitoring and policy planning document, is a good one. This offers the essential advantage of presenting a snapshot of the current political situation in the Sahel zone, and specifically in the countries covered by this report, namely Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal, while emphasising the critical points. With this in mind, Gorée Institute conducted a study on the political outlook in the Sahel countries.

For Gorée Institute, countries such as Burkina, Mali, Niger and Senegal constitute a kind of laboratory for the political future of the entire continent, both through the concentration of the
challenges mentioned above and through the various pacification and resolution processes underway in each of these political areas. We are dealing with states that are fragile in many respects, with more or less convoluted political prospects that require a strong commitment from the actors.

Based on the analysis, a series of recommendations were made to the political classes in Niger, Mali, Burkina and Senegal for a subsequent improvement of the political and security climate in their respective countries. The published study is available on Gorée website and a hard copy available to the public at Gorée headquarters like all other publications.

Overall, the study reached the following general conclusion:

In Burkina, despite the terrorist attacks and the social upheaval, economic growth has remained stable; the population has shown a great capacity of resilience in the face of terrorism and the community antagonisms that it has reawakened; and the alarming projections on Covid-19 have not yet been materialised. These facts now make it possible to weigh the predicted collapse of the country. However, the restoration of the country's unity seems to us to be a priority that the state must take on. The state of play of the socio-political situation in Burkina Faso shows a country that has been pursuing its political transition since the popular uprising of October 2014, which opened up all possible horizons. In addition to the social demands of workers, terrorist attacks have weakened the state and disintegrated the society. So far, interventions (military, social, economic) have not yet shown their effectiveness in reducing terrorist attacks and ethnocultural conflicts. There is a growing recognition that militarism aggravates conflict. The doctrine of military deployment is not questioned by the communities, but they seem to favour the path of reconciliation. It is presented as one of the unused escape routes. Military sources clearly indicate that the armed terrorist groups are looking for a way out. Therefore, reconciliation is the best way out of the crisis, as 'political' reconciliations are of utmost importance at difficult moments in the life of a country. But as the national day of forgiveness organised in March 2000 showed, reconciliation without justice often turns into a fiasco. Thought to be a necessary step in overcoming the socio-political crisis that arose from the murder of journalist Nobert Zongo and his three companions, and in reconciling Burkinabé, the government at the time bypassed justice and imposed a political ritual. Celebrated with great fanfare, the national day of forgiveness has neither reconciled the political class nor society with the state. This explains why the popular uprising of October 2014 occurred. For the reconciliation that is envisaged, it is important that it follows the triptych of truth-justice-reconciliation, which the Burkinabé largely adhere to according to the report of the Convention of Civil Society Organisations for Domestic Observation of Elections (CODEL).

In parallel, in Mali, the resumption and consolidation of the democratic process will be done with the Malians and Mali's support partners. In this sense, the fragile situation in which the country finds itself deserves a constructive and progressive approach that respects the functional logic of the different actors. The major challenge of the next transition in Mali, in our view, is to create the
conditions for a break with the current political governance in order to achieve reforms capable of supporting a new political dynamic that will transform Malian society in accordance with the will expressed by the people during the demonstrations in June and July 2020. The political-institutional crisis in Mali is, in itself, only one aspect of a broader and more diverse crisis involving other dimensions (governance, representativeness, security, elections, etc.). However, this crisis has evolved dramatically over the last few years as a result of the interweaving of other factors, both endogenous and exogenous. The new relationships it has created raise a number of questions, while at the same time offering opportunities in the form of a framework for democratic exercise with a real potential for change in terms of reform and consolidation of the democratic process. It remains to be seen whether Malians and Mali’s partners will seize this opportunity to redress the country and bring it out of the multidimensional crisis it is going through.

The success of the 2020-2021 electoral process in Niger will not only be important for Nigeriens. It will also be important for the entire sub-region. For it must be remembered that Niger is an island in an ocean of sub-regional instability. As such, the country plays a determining role in the fight against the various jihadist movements that swarm the sub-region. If the presidential election were to go badly, there would be every reason to fear not only that the country would no longer be able to contribute effectively to the fight against terrorism, but that it would itself become a factor of instability.

On the other hand, a favourable outcome - which in all likelihood appears to be the most likely scenario at present - would strengthen the democratic process and reassure that Niger is strengthening its democratic process and thus remaining a reliable partner in the fight against terrorism and in strengthening regional cooperation.

Finally, with regard to Senegal, the aim was to show factual elements and their future challenges.

These factual elements are firstly the demographic weight of youth in Senegal, with those under 24 years of age representing 60% of the country’s population. These youth are characterised by the reproachful look they have on the country’s economic situation and the image of Senegalese democracy. Moreover, statistical analysis shows a relationship of dependence between the perception of their living conditions and their analysis of the country’s economic situation. This superposition between the demographic weight of youth and the economic insecurity in which they live is an explosive cocktail for Senegalese democracy and its strengthening. Migration in general, and illegal migration in particular, although perilous, appears to be an alternative but, at the same time, remains a safety valve for youth who are ready to do anything (including taking the paths of violence) to get themselves and their families out of poverty. Providing lasting responses to education, employment and the assignment of new places in society, is certainly one of the major challenges for those in charge of the country’s public affairs.

The publication of this study is available at the Gorée Institute and at www.goreeinstitut.org
3. Survey on citizens’ sentiment about governance in Benin

The Gorée Institute conducted a survey to assess citizens’ perceptions and the current state of democracy as an entry point for fostering initiative Power of Dialogue in the country. Part of this survey also includes the formulation of policy recommendations to the respective public institutions with a mandate to address some of the thematic governance issues. It is expected that this will lead to a national dissemination of the findings in various fora and an advocacy initiative to address some of the key issues highlighted by the survey.

A training and capacity-building session for a dozen monitors via the zoom application allowed for the analysis of statistical data in order to complete the qualitative data. A survey questionnaire was developed and administered to the research sample, and the survey was designed to obtain a sample of one thousand (1000) Beninese aged 18 and over in the areas covered. The data is collected on the basis of a form developed from the identification of a number of indicators by the monitors.

The data is collected directly via smartphones or tablets and the Open Data Kit (ODK) application for Android. The findings of the study are broken down into the following variables:

- Citizens’ perceptions of the Parliament
- Perceptions on the rule of law and judicial governance
- Perceptions on participatory democracy
- Perceptions on gender
- Perceptions on political governance
- Perceptions on administrative governance
- Perceptions on the performance of public policies

Based on the findings of the survey on citizens’ perceptions of governance in Benin, some recommendations were made to the State of Benin, Civil Society and ECOWAS.

Recommendations to the Government of Benin:

- Safeguard and strengthen the mechanisms to guarantee rights and freedoms
- Uphold the right of minorities;
• Restore the independence of the judiciary and the trust of citizens;
• Disconnect the collusion that exists between the state sphere, the business sphere and the justice sphere;
• Involve traditional legitimacies in governance arrangements;
• Improve and strengthen the emancipation and empowerment of women and in priority rural women (through access to land, training and finance);
• Support and promote women's political leadership;
• Effectively fight corruption;
• Guarantee the principle of separation of powers;

Recommendations to Beninese civil society:
• Co-produce the involvement of traditional legitimacies in governance arrangements
• Co-produce the improvement and strengthening of women’s emancipation and empowerment and in priority rural women (through access to land, training and financing)
• Co-produce the support and promotion of women's political leadership
• Encourage the promotion and enhancement of youth and women within political parties (citizen activism)
• Improve and strengthen civil society action in the fight against corruption, misappropriation and illicit enrichment, in land governance and in women’s leadership and development

Recommendations to ECOWAS:
• Strengthen the action of the ECOWAS Court of Justice in the protection of human rights
• Develop preventive actions on national issues that may lead to political crisis and actions for crisis and conflict management through alternative dispute resolution
• Expand the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice on issues of democracy (elections and rule of law) and governance.
• Establish mechanisms for inclusive dialogue to prevent crises
4. Study on social values and political systems in Burkina

The Gorée Institute undertook a study during 2020 to assess the mutually reinforcing relationship between social values and the political system in Burkina Faso.

The objective is to assess the correlation between social values and the political system in order to identify gaps and challenges, as well as power relations that have a serious impact on the country’s political system. To do this, the study will review several existing documents and unpublished domestic policy reports, as well as academic contributions highlighting the state of the country’s political system. Gorée Institute expects the findings to pave the way for an evidence-based Power of Dialogue programme as a multi-stakeholder responsive option in Burkina Faso. It is also expected that the adoption of such a guideline with policy recommendations will help to address the divisive political system, foster political tolerance and an inclusive civic space for dialogue.

The survey is designed on the premise that deepening the understanding of socio-cultural values and the political system is a necessary building block for deepening the understanding of the degree of political participation in democratic processes. Gorée Institute anticipates that the findings will pave the way for the evidence-based Power of Dialogue programme as a multi-stakeholder responsive option in Burkina Faso. It is also expected that the adoption of such a guideline with policy recommendations will contribute to combating the divisive political system, fostering political tolerance as well as an inclusive civic space for dialogue.

The argument for this study is that there is a symbiosis and overlapping relationships and effects between social values and the political system, particularly in multi-ethnic societies in Africa. As such, for the political system to be stable, the elements of social values must be taken into account. Similarly, social values need to be embedded in the political system for the sake of political stability, respectively for the rule of law and the consultative process of policy formulation. Similarly, for political processes to be credible, every segment of society must be involved, giving everyone the desired sense of ownership and belonging. Implicitly, the political system must functionally take into account the culture and tradition of the society.

It is in this context that the study seeks to assess the correlation between societal values and the political system in order to identify gaps and challenges, as well as the power relationship that has a serious impact on the country’s political system. In doing so, the study has enabled to: :

- Assess the mutually reinforcing relationship between social values and the political system in Burkina Faso, as an entry point for the Power of Dialogue programme.
• Provide a diagnostic assessment to identify the degree of inclusion and participation of citizens in democratic processes.

• Assess the quality of democracy to identify its strengths and weaknesses, and recommend reform initiatives.

• Propose policy recommendations to relevant state institutions to address some of the identified gaps and challenges.

In short, the study on social values and political systems highlighted certain challenges. Burkina Faso is rich in diversity and secular values that form the basis for community life. One of the greatest challenges is to work on the co-production of positive values that can stimulate community life. This requires respect for the plurality of cultures, including religions. It is therefore imperative to organise coherence between formal and non-formal practices that guarantee serenity and peace. It is urgent that traditional values in line with the secular state and respect for human rights are called upon to give new life to democracy.

The publication of this study is available at Gorée Institute and on the website www.goreeinstitut.org

5. Monitoring institutional stability in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger

The West African region is currently facing rising threats that undermine the foundations of democracy and political stability in countries. It is widely recognised that institutional stability is one of the scales used to measure a country’s democratic progress and that it is in turn determined by the level of democratic maturity.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are facing the jihadist threat, as is Nigeria. While Niger and Burkina Faso are currently in a process of democratic consolidation, Mali is experiencing some difficulties in overcoming political instability punctuated by coups.

Gorée Institute, in partnership with the National Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), wishes to undertake this monitoring exercise on the basis that institutional instability has contributed to the emergence and proliferation of violent conflict, increased poverty, inequality, youth unemployment and poor policy implementation in politically unstable countries in West Africa, and that these threats to institutional stability in the target countries are numerous and interconnected. Above all, weak leadership and institutions have contributed to increased instances of corruption, lack of accountability and rule of law. While it is pertinent to recognise that these factors limit the countries' growth and development, they are also symptomatic of the general governance deficit in the three focus countries. The above implies that weak state institutions, deteriorating governance environments, and a lack of leadership skills and lack of respect for human rights are some of the characteristics of the institutional instability observed in the three focus countries over the years.

This situation continues to have a negative impact on economic growth, social cohesion and youth unemployment; and thus contributes equally to state fragility, low economic growth and political intolerance.

The main objective of this monitoring is to diagnose the sources of institutional instability in the three countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). Specifically, it is to deepen understanding of, and help inform, the evidence-based interventions of the Power of Dialogue programme; to provide country-by-country monitoring of structural vulnerability caused by institutional instability in the target countries in West Africa; to complement the event-based data from the countries in West
Africa; to complement event-based data to provide Gorée Institute and policymakers with more contextualised information and analysis to support institutional reform; and to conduct retrospective early warning and response analysis to identify empirical precursors to institutional instability and determine channels of communication with policymakers.

Based on the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Goree Institute attempts to assess the capacity of countries to deal effectively with both external and internal sources of institutional instability. The present assessment covered Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

To assess institutional stability in the three countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, we used a questionnaire with 73 questions. In August 2020, 30 monitors, 10 per country, collected original data on each of the three countries, answering standardised questions. The indicators monitored were taken from the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). The indicators are divided into 14 groups and 27 sub-groups. Respondents assessed institutional stability by giving a score between 1 (Poor) and 5 (Excellent).

The assessment yielded the following results:

- A strong progression of Niger, which with an overall score of 2.7/5 against 2.31 in 2017, achieves the best progression.
- An average progression of Burkina Faso, which, with a score of 2.58/5 against 2.43 in 2017, just achieved a score equal to the average.
- A weak progression of Mali which, with a score of 2.42/5 against 2.37 in 2017, remained below average.

Recommandations

To States

In general :

- Consolidate the achievements and correct the structural weaknesses revealed by this assessment

Specifically :

- Take ownership of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) evaluation reports
- Speed up operationalisation of national early warning centres
- Involve civil society more in particular in early warning and preventive diplomacy
- Enhance transparency and participation in the management of natural resources
- Strengthen internal and cross-border security by fully engaging in the realisation of bilateral and sub-regional security cooperation initiatives.
- Strengthen the security of organisations working in humanitarian assistance
- Have a more holistic approach to conflict prevention with a focus on the resilience of populations, including humanitarian aspects
- Ensure that the defence forces observe human rights, particularly in the context of the fight against terrorism
- Combine the fight against terrorism and access to information for the media
- Increase the role of youth and women in the prevention and settlement of disputes
- Develop a national action plan for peace education and implement it where appropriate

**To civil society organisations**

- Take ownership of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) assessment reports and contribute to their dissemination
- Be more involved in early warning and preventive diplomacy
- Raise awareness on ECOWAS standby forces
- Enhance advocacy for transparency in natural resource governance and get involved in related dispute resolution
- Strengthen peace education programmes
- Enhance advocacy for the consolidation of the rule of law in the context of the fight against terrorism

**Recommendations to ECOWAS**

- Take ownership of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) assessment reports produced by civil society
- Support the operationalisation of national centres on early warning
- Expand cooperation with civil society to actors other than WANEP
- Ensure that states widely involve civil society actors in national warning centres
- Support civil society in awareness campaigns on the civilian dimension of ECOWAS standby forces
- Strengthen the operationality of ECOWAS standby forces
- Support States in the implementation of bilateral and regional security agreements
• Revise the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance to introduce stringent provisions on term limits and combat practices of instrumentalizing the law to exclude candidates from elections.

• Take positive actions for countries, like Mali, that are experiencing more difficulties in operationalising ECPF.

The publication of this study is available at Gorée Institute and on the website www.goreeinstitut.org

6. Monitoring of citizens' perception of the state of democracy and governance in Senegal

In Senegal, good governance has been established as a principle with constitutional value. As such, it occupies an important place in the evaluation of public policies. Gorée Institute is engaged in this exercise by monitoring citizens' perceptions of governance in Senegal since the last legislative elections in 2017.

To do this, a questionnaire developed on the basis of governance indicators was administered by ten (10) monitors previously trained in data collection via the Open Data Kit (ODK) application. 614 citizens of the Dakar region of different genders, educational levels and age groups gave their opinions on the state of governance in Senegal.

The results of the survey show that the vast majority of citizens interviewed have a negative perception of governance in its various forms.

With regard to democratic and political governance, the survey reveals a number of achievements, including Senegal's status as a constitutional democracy, its political and institutional stability, the freedom to create political parties, the inclusiveness of elections, and freedom of opinion and the press. On the other hand, essential pillars of democracy and the rule of law have been weakened.

These include the separation of powers, the effective protection of human rights, respect for constitutional legality, the transparency of electoral processes and the place and role of the opposition. Although Senegal often claims to have an exemplary administrative tradition, the survey reveals an administrative governance in crisis. The administration is considered highly politicised, not very transparent in its operations and not very efficient in its services in education, health and especially sanitation.

Local governance is characterised by a profound imbalance. Although it is an established reality, the very limited achievements are essentially due to the emergence of a certain form of local democracy that involves certain local actors. However, in substance, it is neither transparent, nor participatory, nor effective.

Economic governance appears even more problematic. Budgeting remains weakly participatory and the management of public procurement and natural resources is not very transparent and equitable.

In addition, accountability remains weak and the fight against corruption ineffective. The result is impunity for state officials who are rarely sanctioned.

This overall negative perception of governance in its various dimensions remains invariable whether viewed from the point of view of gender, age group or level of education. The rare
cases concern, for example, natural resources, where only respondents with higher education gave a clear answer to the question of the transparency of the management of these resources.

However, this overall negative perception must be tempered because, beyond the achievements of governance, a high level of misunderstanding of certain aspects of governance by the respondents was noted. Indeed, on certain questions, the number of respondents without a precise opinion was significant.

It should be noted that the perception of the place and role of women in governance in its various forms appears to be average overall.

In order to consolidate the achievements and address the weaknesses noted, the recommendations below have been formulated.

On democratic and political governance:

- Enhance the transparency and inclusiveness of electoral processes
- Set up procedures to consult the population during substantial constitutional revision initiatives
- Make the status of the opposition operational
- Strengthen the independence of the National Assembly and the control exercised over government action
- Modernise justice, in particular through the digitalisation of judicial procedures
- Strengthen the independence of the judiciary in accordance with international standards in this field
- Increase the role and place of women in political and democratic governance

On administrative governance:

- Adopt a law on access to information
- Depoliticize the administration through the use of call for applications, particularly for high administrative positions
▪ Raise the technical level of health structures
▪ Make education and health priority funding sectors for the local authorities' equalisation and support fund
▪ Promote participatory governance

On local governance:
▪ Guarantee access to national resources for local authorities
▪ Ensure the training of local elected representatives
▪ Reduce the gap between the law that is enshrined and the law that is applied.
▪ Make texts accessible in a language that can be understood by local authorities
▪ Promote and strengthen mechanisms for citizen participation

On economic governance:
▪ Increase the awareness of the population on governance and its issues
▪ Involve other actors, particularly civil society, in the preparation of the budget
▪ Better supervise private contracts
▪ Ensure the effective application of sanctions provided for in case of violation of the Public Procurement Code
▪ Involve the opposition and civil society in the entire value chain of mineral resource exploitation
▪ Make the local authorities' equalisation and support fund operational
▪ Diligently implement the reforms undertaken in the governance of mineral resources
▪ Complete the reform of the oil law for transparent, inclusive and equitable governance of natural resources
▪ Align the institutional and legal framework for fighting corruption with international standards in this area
▪ Specifically strengthen methods of raising awareness among the population on the evils of corruption
▪ Apply severe sanctions to officials guilty of corruption
▪ Adopt specific anti-corruption strategies for the sectors most affected by corruption
B. CONSOLIDATION DE LA PAIX ET PREVENTION DES CONFLITS

Within the framework of this second programmatic pillar of Gorée Institute, the focus in 2020 was on the implementation of the natural resource governance project in Senegal. This involved organising:

- a webinar on the equitable sharing of natural resources in West Africa
- the production of a documentary film "cross-perspectives on the extractive industry in Senegal"
- the production of a documentary film on "Citizens' perceptions on the governance of natural resources in Senegal"
- the organisation of a series of community dialogues on the governance of mineral resources in extractive zones in Senegal
- the production of analysis documents on the governance of mineral resources in Senegal
- Regional meeting to share best practices and lessons learned on mineral resources governance in West Africa

All of these activities under the natural resource governance programme have been funded by the Ford Foundation and implemented in a collaborative partnership approach with civil society organisations, the state, the Network of Parliamentarians for Mineral Resource Governance (RGM), communities in impacted areas and private sector stakeholders.

1. Webinar: COVID-19 and Inclusive Management of Mineral Resources: The Case of the Senegalese Mining Sector

Gorée Institute, in its drive to promote the establishment of multi-stakeholder frameworks for dialogue, reflection and consultation, has developed a concept called "Gorée Institute Thursdays". A framework for reflection on the major issues and challenges of the continent, particularly in terms of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, whose first session in webinar was organised on 18 June 2020 with the theme: COVID-19 and inclusive management of mineral resources: the case of the Senegalese mining sector.

The webinar addressed three topics:

- Covid-19 and the Ministry of Mines and Geology’s containment measures
- Covid-19 and communities impacted by mining operations: lessons learned and perspectives
Impacts of COVID on the Senegalese extractive industry

For Senegal, despite the worrying situation of COVID-19, the mining sector has not experienced any temporary or permanent cessation of mining activity, nor has it recorded any redundancies or mine closures for economic or quarantine reasons. This does not mean, however, that the sector has not been impacted by the pandemic. Mining companies and communities in the vicinity of the mines were heavily impacted by COVID-19. Several impacts were identified as soon as COVID-19 was declared. The economy of the companies was affected by the measures taken to limit the spread of COVID-19. Communities whose survival was based on the benefits of mining operations were also heavily affected.

a. Impacts on businesses

Mining companies are not exempt from this health crisis. The impacts of COVID-19 are numerous and specific due to complex procurement, a heavy supply chain, the number of expatriate managers, sometimes rigid standards and procedures, etc. Indeed, the travel restriction measures have strongly affected the sector. The reduction in the company’s staff turnover with the consequent introduction of teleworking, the closure of borders which has led to the suspension of the material supply chain and the costs generated because every minute of "standby" is charged. So if restrictions are made because of the pandemic, there may be a dispute between the service provider, which is the drilling company, and the customer, which is the company. Furthermore, the lack of harmonisation of procedures for controlling the spread of the virus at the border, such as containment and quarantine formalities, has resulted in a loss of time and high costs for companies. These situations have led to a reorganisation of work in mining companies, resulting in reduced working hours and lower income.

b. Impacts on communities

COVID-19 has also not spared the local communities that are active in mineral extraction or that benefit from the spin-offs of mining activity. In this respect, COVID-19 has led to a halt in artisanal activities, one of the main activities of communities in the mining areas, and a drop in the implementation of the Investment Action Plans (IAPs) of companies whose resources have been redirected to the fight against the pandemic. In addition, there has been a decline in certain ongoing activities in the area, such as market gardening and the volume of sales, due to a lack of market. The mining companies only buy part of the produce of the women involved in market gardening. This situation has exacerbated the level of poverty and the risk of food insecurity, with deaths recorded, the deprivation of morals and the exacerbation of clandestine exploitation with the associated security risks. The training of young girls benefiting from Teranga-Gold support has also been delayed because of COVID-19.

Challenges and prospects for effective mitigation of the impacts of Covid-19 in the mining sector

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a moment of reflection on the decisions to be made in the face of the multiple impacts in the mining sector. It has laid bare challenges and opportunities for the various actors to manage such situations.
For the Ministry of Mines and Geology

Faced with the pandemic, the Ministry of Mines, the first body to be called upon, has identified a number of challenges:

- Bring together artisanal miners into Economic Interest Groups (EIGs) to enable them to have fairly reliable entities so that they can benefit from the Ministry’s support in the framework of a partnership.
- Support gold miners to develop other income generating activities such as market gardening, agriculture, etc.
- Setting up a more effective partnership mechanism between the mine and the communities for better benefits for the latter.
- Encouraging the establishment of communities in the industry’s value chains.
- Accompanying companies, artisanal and semi-mechanised mines and communities for the post COVID-19 period.
- Operationalise supporting funds such as the equalisation fund, the support fund for local communities and the rehabilitation fund.
- Strengthen economic resilience and the emergence of an industrial fabric through local content.
- Readjust legislation in concert with regional organisations for more decisive action.
- Foster emergence for mining companies.

For companies

- Use all the opportunities offered by new technologies in the implementation of mining operations;
- Redesign mining organisations to better cope with the new constraints and challenges of the pandemic.
- Reduce expatriate staff by qualified local staff.
- Optimise CSR returns by directing them towards resilient investment actions for affected communities.
- Reconsider the relationship between Western countries such as the US and China in terms of mineral resources trade policy.
- Enhance the spontaneous corporate solidarity developed during the COVID-19 period between mining companies, administrations and communities.
- Enhance the relationships developed during the COVID-19 period with the communities for the companies.
• For communities
  ▪ Benefit from the funds provided by the Mining Code
  ▪ Benefit from the opportunities of the law on local content of the sector in consultation phase
  ▪ Diversify income-generating activities
  ▪ Benefit from professional opportunities in mining companies

2. Regional meeting to share and exchange best practices on mineral resources governance in West Africa

Following its activities since 2018 within the framework of its Mineral Resources Governance (MRG) Project in West Africa funded by the Ford Foundation, the Institute has started the second phase of its Project by organising a two-day Multi-Stakeholder Meeting on 21 and 22 December 2020. A regional meeting to share and exchange best practices in mineral resources governance in West Africa.

This second regional meeting on the island of Gorée brought together actors from the African mining sector from six (6) countries, members of state institutions, the private sector, civil society, universities and research and training centres working in the extractive industry. By bringing together actors from the mining sector in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire and the Republic of Guinea, the Institute is part of a sub-regional dynamic of sharing experiences and best practices between these various countries in order to strengthen inclusive practices in the extractive industries, but also to promote best practices in terms of transparency and accountability, not only in Senegal, but in the entire West African region. Through the reflections that came out of the interactions, innovative strategies were defined to build better inclusive, transparent and developmental extractive industries.
It should be recalled that the first phase of this MRG Project, which aims to promote the fair and equitable sharing of revenues from mineral and oil resources in Africa, focused on frameworks for consultation, dialogue and reflection, as well as capacity building and access to information through the development of a technological platform and a study on the perception of the exploitation of mineral resources in Senegal. In addition, given the context of COVID 19, the institute focused on technology and access to information for fair and equitable governance. This was done through the organisation of several webinars, the production of documentary films and animated videos, the dissemination of research findings and the organisation of talks with communities in mining areas in the regions of Kédougou, Matam and Thiès.

For the Regional Meeting held on 21-22 December, mechanisms were put in place to promote local content and inclusive business practices, transparency and equity. This multi-stakeholder forum provided a forum for dialogue to prevent corruption and reduce corruption niches, promote accountability and mitigate the negative impacts of exploitation. It was also about finding ways to maximise the benefits of exploitation for the States, the populations, the communities in the exploitation areas, the individuals evolving in the sectors negatively impacted by exploitation, women and youth.

Two days of exchange and sharing that enabled to identify the disparities, similarities and convergences of the governance of mineral resources in the 6 West African countries which are Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Republic of Guinea, Niger, Ivory Coast.

Strong observations were made. Actors from the various countries represented at this regional meeting to share and exchange best practices in mineral resources governance in West Africa said that they were generally suffering from the negative externalities of mineral resources exploitation. It was also noted that the extractive sector generates little added value due to a lack of policies and strategies for the transformation of mineral resources.

Beyond the observation of an almost similar system of governance with regulatory provisions that present points of convergence and similarities and a somewhat diversified practice, these exchanges made it possible to note the place given to civil society. In Burkina Faso, for example, the regulations are relatively respected, with the inclusion of civil society allowing it to have a say in the governance of resources. In Senegal, although the regulations have several advantages and the inclusion of civil society is enshrined in the texts and there is a certain openness of the bodies responsible for reflection and orientation, effective application, particularly in matters relating to the granting of conventions, permits and other mining titles, is still awaited.

In the Republic of Guinea, civil society has played a major role in the reforms of legal instruments. All the notable achievements have been driven by the unfailing mobilisation of CSOs. However, this has not enabled the mining sector, one of the richest in West Africa, to be exploited to the full. A similar situation exists in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger, where, despite the legal framework, there are several shortcomings and a 'disarmed' civil society that does not have the means to act.

This is why, beyond the legal framework, there are several shortcomings and a "disarmed" civil society that is unable to play a major role in the sector.

Therefore, beyond the recommendations presented below for each country, one of the
consensuses of the actors present, is the setting up of a regional platform. An Alliance of West African Initiatives to help promote transparent and inclusive management of mineral resources. With an approach at country and regional level, the axes of intervention are, among others, research and knowledge production, lobbying and advocacy, support and capacity building of communities and parliamentarians, and finally, sharing of experiences and best practices..

Recommendations to countries:

1) Burkina Faso:

- Supervise and support youth, giving them the maximum information and training on related trades, which are the biggest providers of jobs.
- Provide more support to local suppliers to facilitate interaction with mining companies.
- Enhance vocational training and research, with better involvement of the university and the creation of the mining trades institute to train skilled workers and not be limited to the training of engineers;
- Ensure access to information for journalists to avoid suspicions and suspicions of bad governance;
- Ensure that mining funds directly impact communities to avoid claims and likely uprisings and at the same time avoid additional expenses for companies;
- Give the people the possibility to refer to the Constitutional Council in case of litigation;
- Burkina must move away from the notion of "first come, first served", in view of its situation as a country rich in mineral resources;
- Encourage the state to meet its commitments.

2)- Republic of Guinea:

- Focus on the development of its agriculture. The country is even considered an agricultural scandal given the huge opportunities that are underexploited.
- Make efforts as part of respect for women’s rights. The promotion of equity is underway, but there are efforts to be made in this direction.
- Revise Guinea's tax system, which is not favourable.
- Support local suppliers in the framework of local content to meet the quality requirement.

3)- Côte d’Ivoire:

- Improve the legal and regulatory framework;
- Improve governance of the artisanal gold mining sector, a driver of social and political tensions, money laundering, terrorism financing, diseases, etc;
- Insist on environmental protection
- Develop agriculture alongside traditional gold panning
- Advocate for the application of texts;
• Combat corruption;
• Involve mutual development organisations;
• With the support of Gorée Institute and financial partners, hold a forum on artisanal gold mining in West Africa;
• Setting up an African standard to solve problems related to the exploitation of mineral resources;
• Advocating on behalf of Ivorian civil society, so that donors agree to fund their activities.

3)- Senegal:

• The operationalisation of the Local Development Support Fund, the Mining Sites Rehabilitation Fund
• The revision of the criteria for a better distribution of the resources of the Equalization and Support Fund FPACL
• The elaboration and implementation of a national strategy for the development of the mining products processing industry
• The establishment of a strategy and a framework for reflection on the valorisation of local content and the promotion of local suppliers,
• The setting up of a consultation mechanism for all stakeholders to achieve the best sustainability performance of the extractive industry.
• The establishment of a geological and mining information system and an oil cadastre system.
• The establishment of a Community regulation;
• Insist on environmental management plans;
• Redefine and frame CSR so that it becomes a source of development of basic social services;
• Work on eliminating moral pressure and repression of Senegalese civil society actors

4)- Mali:

• Align all mining companies to a single legal regime
• Create the conditions for a better diversified mining sector integrated into the national economy
• Support and accompany national SMEs/SMIs in order to better meet the needs of the extractive industry in terms of local supply
• Adopt policies for systematic data disclosure along the extractive industries value chain.
• Explore the path of resource transformation in our countries.
• Revise its mining cadastre and diversify its mining activities by developing industrial quarrying to develop cement.
5) Niger:

- Promote and foster transparency in the extraction and sharing of mining and oil revenues and to do so:
  - Pay the 15% in full to the communes to enable them to take charge of basic social services;
  - Involve all actors in sharing the retroceded amounts;
  - Respect the 15% provided by law for oil royalties;
  - Make effective the sharing of these funds to the different communes in accordance with the law;
  - Grant in time and regularly to the communes, the corresponding sums of these royalties;
  - Make these funds available to each department in charge of monitoring.
  - Make the best use of the funds from the oil royalty;
  - Make more visible the achievements made with the retroceded funds;
  - Involve the impacted populations by informing them each time these funds are collected;
  - Involve all the actors of the commune in the choice of investments to be made;
  - Carry out income-generating activities (IGA) for the benefit of youth, in order to reduce unemployment.

3. Webinar: Institutional stability and lessons from the Malian crisis

The restoration of democracy and the defence of democratic institutions in African political processes are very important for both the stability and development of Africa. Both conditions are essential for the existence of political accountability in the exercise of power, which is the main guarantor of the appropriate use of available resources to improve the quality of life and reduce tensions and crises.

During the webinar on the topic "Institutional Stability and Democratic Perspectives: Lessons from the Current Malian Crisis" three (03) themes were addressed. The first one was presented by Mr. Sidy Alpha Ndiaye, Professor of Law (UCAD) on "The role of regional institutions in institutional stability and democratic prospects in West Africa". The second, presented by Mr. Baba Dakono, Executive Secretary of the Citizen’s Observatory on Governance and Security, was on "The socio-political crisis against a backdrop of security issues, what impacts, what challenges for national and regional stability". Finally, the third theme addressed by Dr. Foussey Doumbia, Lecturer and researcher in Public Law and Political Science (University of Bamako), dealt with the issue of "The Malian socio-political crisis and the difficult question of the responsibility of the holders of power in Africa, what role for national institutions?"

This is why the Institute, in the framework of its "Thursdays of Gorée Institute" as a framework for reflection, dialogue and multi-stakeholder consultation, has set the debate on 3 September 2020.
This webinar on the Malian socio-political crisis, with its interweaving of various factors, provided a critical overview of the role of national and regional bodies in institutional and democratic stability. After all, crises call into question the effectiveness and efficiency of the measures and frameworks put in place in this regard.

The challenges and prospects are many and varied and affect several dimensions: political at national and regional level, but also social, security, etc..

**Challenges and prospects for institutional and democratic stability in Mali**

- Promote respect for the rule of law
- Promote the criminalisation of unconstitutional changes by regional and sub-regional bodies.
- Promote the renunciation of power grabbing
- Promote the integration of peoples
- Avoiding erratic reception of EU standards and obligations in Member States
- Improving the sanction system at Community level
- Rethink the objectives of the AU as provided for in Article 3 of the AU Treaty, in a dialogic and inclusive logic.
- Proceed with a revision of the Malian constitution
- Eradicate personal and patrimonial management of public affairs
- Overhaul the Constitutional Court with a view to restore trust between it and the citizens.
- Overhaul the current regime governing political parties in order to put an end to the endemic phenomenon of political nomadism and the proliferation of political parties.
- Establish a single regulatory body for the media.
- Transfer the prerogatives of the High Court of Justice to the ordinary courts
- Pursue decentralisation in order to have a more adapted and non-politicised administration.
- Promote the peaceful and democratic settlement of the conflict with the inhabitants of Northern Mali.
• Restore confidence of citizens and governors.

• Respond to the legitimate expectations of the population, particularly in the areas of security, health and employment.

• Identify the logics of engagement with jihadist groups and take appropriate measures to curb them.

**In the short and medium term:**

• The issue of timing and management of the transition

• The division of roles between military and civilian

• Promoting the participation of women in the reforms

• The coordination of management bodies during the transition

• The implementation of ECOWAS schemes

• The challenges of organising elections to avoid disputes

• The development of a coordinated strategy with the actors for a better management of security issues

4. Community dialogues on the governance of natural resources in Senegal: Thiès, Matam and Kédougou from 15 to 22 November 2020

Fair and equitable sharing of mining revenues is a real challenge. In several mineral-supplying states, local populations are confronted with a real problem of access to the benefits of mineral substances. The discovery of mineral resources is supposed to contribute to the development of new trades, the strengthening and revitalisation of existing ones and thus boost local development. However, we often see the abandonment of traditional sectors such as agriculture and animal husbandry in favour of mining activities such as gold panning with various consequences.

Mining is often the cause of damage of which the populations are the main direct victims. These include environmental pollution, poor access to drinking water, prostitution, and impacts on education, health and quality of life. Furthermore, there are few positive externalities in economic and development terms, such as the creation of jobs, infrastructure, etc.

Gorée Institute, in partnership with the Civil Forum, organised community talks that identified the impacts and expectations of the populations of the localities hosting the mining sites in the regions of Thiès, Matam and Kédougou.

The objective of the talks was to facilitate access to information, to set the scene for debate and to raise the expectations of communities in order to help lay the foundations for more informed and citizen-centred governance of mining resources.
• How did we proceed?

A multidisciplinary team from the Gorée Institute and the Civil Forum composed of university researchers, statisticians and journalists was deployed in the field in the mining areas of Darou Khoudoss in the Thiès region, Hamady Ounaré in the Matam region and Kédougou region in order to contribute to the fair and equitable sharing of revenues from the exploitation of mineral resources, an objective set by the Project that Gorée Institute has been running for Senegal since 2018, with the support of the Ford Foundation. These community talks follow several strategies and methods that have been tested and used to obtain information on the governance of mineral resources in the regions hosting mining projects. Firstly, monitoring of the perception of the populations in the areas of exploitation on the impact of mining resources, which will be carried out in 2019 with a report produced and shared with all the stakeholders. Secondly, the production of various documentary films, including one on the lessons of the governance of mining resources, set in the village of Ngade Ngomène in the Thiès region, and another which presents a cross-perspective between actors in the field from the public administration, civil society, the private sector and Parliament, in order to identify their visions, perspectives and expectations. All of these productions were made available, particularly in the local language, as well as a presentation on local content and exchanges, which made it possible to promote access to information, to collect the expectations of the population and to reinforce and strengthen the findings of the monitoring of perceptions on the impacts of mining.

• What did we learn?

The impacts revealed by the films were confirmed by the local populations. During the debates, the participants felt that phosphate mining in the Thiès region affects the lives of the people. The installation of ICS has not favoured the creation of jobs, and has caused traditional activities such as agriculture and market gardening to decline. Due to the use of chemicals such as gas, plantations no longer grow and people struggle to feed themselves and sink into poverty. In the Matam region, this poverty is exacerbated by both low and partial compensation for farmers, although pastoralists have also lost their pastoral areas to mining.

Also in this region, whether in HAMADY OUNARE, NDENDORY or ORKADIERE, the machine used by the mining company SOMIVA is the source of noise pollution, thus impacting the sleep of the
inhabitants. According to the local population, the main cause of respiratory diseases and cancer is the dust produced during mining operations. Mining causes the same impacts, as if it were a natural phenomenon in any mining project.

Like the first two regions, the impacts of mining projects in the KEDOUGOU region revolve around air and land pollution, loss of arable land, displacement of populations, prostitution, etc. In this region, the agents of the mining department specified in their statement that the pollution denounced by the communities is done by foreigners secretly protected by the local populations.

Amidst these impacts, women and children bear the brunt and are the most vulnerable. For women, there has been a decline in informal activities such as agriculture, in favour of gold panning, where the corridors are difficult for them to access. And some, due to migration flows, are involved in prostitution. As for the children, they tend to abandon school to help their mothers and families and thus become involved in activities linked to mining. Others, such as those in NDENDORY, experience other difficulties such as access to their school due to the sand from the factory which invades the roads and can remain for months without being removed. The nearby company also causes noise pollution which disturbs the pupils.

In terms of job creation and transparency in the Thiès region, the communities were keen to inform that the SGO is making much more effort than the ICS for having set up a recruitment commission that favours local staff.

However, in the Matam region, particularly in HAMADY OUNARE, NDENDORY and ORKADIHERE, people are victims of job losses due to illegal procedures. Indeed, workers who fall ill are systematically dismissed after their recovery. This violation of labour rules contributes to the weakening of community participation. In addition, there is competition from employees outside the mining region. This lack of community preference is a potential source of tension between the local communities and the mining companies.

Access to information remains a major challenge. Moreover, during the talks, a misunderstanding was raised. In Hamady Ounare, the population and the authorities had stopped communicating because of accusations of mismanagement of mining funds earmarked to their locality. Gorée Institute team, backed up by civil society, made it clear that the mining funds are not yet operational. This clarification helped to reduce the tensions that had finally divided the communities. The same observation was made in DAROU KHOUDOSS where the population bemoans the lack of publication of mining contracts. The intervention of the Director of the Regional Mining Department of Thiès helped to clarify the situation for the population, particularly with regard to the availability of information on mining conventions online and the slow distribution of funds due to a lack of consensus on the distribution criteria for the equalisation fund.

Despite this progress in the provision of information, a difficult collaboration between civil society and local authorities was noted. This situation sometimes weakens the exchange between these two entities and the possibilities of access to information. The lack of inclusion of youth and women remains a real challenge in the mining regions visited by the Gorée Institute team.

As for the local development fund, the delay in its collection is the result, for the time being, of the refusal of mining companies to accept it as an additional burden, thus violating the stability clause of the contracts concluded under the 1988 and 2003 laws.
• Recommendations

- Recommendations for Darou KHOUDOSS - Thiès Region

  ◦ There is an urgent need to redefine the needs of affected communities. Survival mechanisms should be put in place to provide displaced communities with housing and income-generating activities.

  ◦ In the mining areas, it is important, for the sake of transparency, to set up recruitment commissions for employers in the industry in Darou khoudoss. The importance of these commissions will promote a control of the compliance of mining companies with local content objectives.

  ◦ Transforming the CIFOP in Mboro into a technical high school would be a very good innovation. The establishment of a technical high school will enable the emergence of required local skills and the reduction of the use of expatriates.

  ◦ It will also be necessary to involve the locality of Ngade Ngomène in decision-making to avoid disputes.

  ◦ The State must assess the findings of environmental and social impact studies before the work leading to phosphate mining. It must also verify the rehabilitation plan, including its feasibility.

  ◦ Mining companies need to work with communities. As such, it is important that they sit at the table with communities explaining concretely what they have done in the context of CSR. Make the distinction between voluntary and mandatory CSR.

- Recommendations for HAMADY OUNARE - Matam Region

  ◦ As a result of the talks, the communities proposed a review of the recruitment methods for employees in the mining industries.

  ◦ Companies are encouraged to develop a training programme for local populations. In this regard, the State must support companies by adopting regulations that can facilitate training and capacity building for communities.

  ◦ Promote affirmative actions in favour of local communities.

  ◦ Remove intermediaries between communities and key actors in mining projects (states and mining company managers).

  ◦ Participate in equipping local hospitals in areas where the mineral is mined.

  ◦ Extend compensation to livestock farmers and traders.

  ◦ Promote the presence of mining company executives in workshops organised by CSOs.

  ◦ Fight against misinformation

  ◦ Involve populations, especially youth and women in decision-making.
• **Recommendations for Kédougou**

  ◦ Avoid the exclusion of locals in procurement, mining companies should express their needs in advance, i.e. within a reasonable timeframe. This will enable local suppliers to react in a timely manner.

  ◦ Mining wealth and its benefit in the economy must be redefined so that communities no longer see it as a curse or a substance to be exported.

  ◦ Improve the situation of women at mining sites by rigorously enforcing rules prohibiting the use of chemicals.

  ◦ Promote access to the content of contracts and reports. This requires the state to deploy experts to conduct an awareness campaign, popularising mining contracts and the content of reports.

  ◦ Populations must be involved in the drafting of CSR reports to avoid disputes.

  ◦ Promote the free and informed consent of populations before mining companies are installed in the locality.

  ◦ Mining companies must respect the models presented to the public in mining operations.

  ◦ Populations suffering from pollution should agree to denounce foreigners who use cyanide in gold panning operations.

  ◦ Parents of students are encouraged to enrol their students in the Civil Engineering Department to promote local competence.
5. Production of documentary films and analysis documents on the governance of mineral resources in Senegal

During the year 2020, Gorée Institute produced two documentary films on the governance of mineral resources in Senegal: "Stakeholders' cross-perspectives" and "Citizens' perceptions of mineral resource governance". In addition to the documentary films, motion designs were produced to help the population better understand the challenges and issues related to the good governance of mineral resources.

Gorée Institute’s film production is an advocacy tool that can serve as a lever for social change for the benefit of citizens. It aims to contribute to the transformation of natural resources into a real lever for the development of human capital (education, training, health, social security) and social capital (strengthening social ties, fighting corruption, promoting democracy and cohesion that can lead to economic stability in Africa). Natural resources are an asset of the people. The quality of institutions and governance can help ensure that their inclusive management does not lead to social imbalances that deteriorate human or social capital, but rather to social sustainability for all citizens by increasing their potential and freedom.

Various analysis documents in policy brief format were produced and used as advocacy tools. These include:

- Oil, gas and mining projects facing the covid-19 threat: a review of the Senegalese mining sector
- Health, environment and quality of life in the exploitation of mining resources: the perception of the populations of Matam, Kédougou and Thiès
- Has the evolution of mining industry regulation met the objectives of mining policy in Senegal?
- Jobs, infrastructure, opportunities, corruption, environment: how mining is perceived by local populations
- Exploitation of Senegal's mineral resources: recommendations on the role of parliament
- Women's rights in the extractive industry, recognition and need for further trainings
- Covid-19 and inclusive management of mineral resources: the case of the Senegalese mining sector
III

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
III. Strategic partnerships

As 2020 is a year of transition for Gorée Institute and the end of the funding cycle with some financial partners, the focus has been on mobilising resources through the building of multi-stakeholder partnerships in the form of a Consortium in order to optimise both our resources and our impact. In addition to ongoing projects and partners, Gorée Institute has established two strategic partnerships in the framework of two programmes:

1. PROGRAMME "POWER OF DIALOGUE" - POD 2021-2025

The PoD programme focuses on building the capacity of women and aspiring young leaders. This capacity building enables them to effectively influence and participate in political processes that respect and promote democratic norms and values. The empowerment of women and youth is therefore a central theme of the programme.

Civic and political actors are at the heart of the programme as both groups have complementary roles to play. While civic actors legitimately advocate for the needs of the population, political actors must be responsive and accountable to the population. As women- and youth-led associations are not always organised in a traditional and institutionalised way, the Consortium makes the deliberate choice to also work with these emerging associations and equip them to take on their leadership and influence roles.

The ultimate goal of the PoD Consortium is to "contribute to a peaceful democratic space and inclusive, responsive and representative political decision-making at all levels". The programme focuses specifically on young and aspiring women leaders as change agents for inclusive political systems and peaceful political change. These leaders need concrete support to enter the political system and exercise their right to influence decision-making.

The Consortium strongly believes that it is also essential to connect youth and women leaders with other civic and political actors, and to foster broad and legitimate alliances between established and less established actors. Such alliances can help leaders assert their right to influence and participate in decision-making spaces. In addition, the programme emphasises the need to create enabling environments that address the needs of women, youth and other excluded groups, to also stimulate dialogue, to protect human rights and to promote inclusive policies at local, national and international levels.

The Consortium has identified four connected and mutually reinforcing outcomes in our Theory of Change (ToC). The first outcome, CSO capacity building, is the catalyst for all other outcomes.

Two key principles have guided the programme, namely complementarity and continuity. To ensure a high quality proposal, complementarity between the Consortium partners is at the heart of our ToC, particularly with regard to the political inclusion of youth and women, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and Lobbying and Advocacy (L&AP) at regional and international level. These areas of expertise are key to achieving the four outcomes identified in our ToC. The second principle is continuity.

As transformational change processes take time to mature, the Consortium believes it is essential to allow existing programme partners to deepen and sustain their programmatic impact, within the limits of the policy framework.
The geographical focus of the Consortium reflects the priorities of the MFA, the programmatic needs and the track record of the Consortium. Based on this assessment, the Consortium proposes to work in the following regions: Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal), Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan), Middle East and North Africa (Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq), Central and Latin America (Guatemala and Colombia), Southern Africa (Mozambique) and Asia (Myanmar).

This document presents the Multi-Year Plan of the Strategic Partnership between the Power of Dialogue (PoD) Consortium and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), for the period 2021-2025. It operationalises the application grant that was jointly submitted in March 2020 by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), Gorée Institute (GORIN), the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies (CEMI) and Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMwA), under the Power of Voices (PoV).

2. THE CHARTER PROJECT AFRICA - CPA 2021-2023

This project aims to support the emergence of innovative citizens’ initiatives operating at the continental level to promote and monitor the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance - ACDEG. This EU-funded project is designed and submitted by the Consortium composed of the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), the Democracy Works Foundation (DWF), Africtivists, Code Africa and Gorée Institute.

This initiative will address the political and structural barriers that limit civil society engagement in the AGA and is designed in recognition of the central role that civil society can play in the realisation of the AU’s strategic vision, as reflected in Agenda 2063. It is also aligned with the "EU Strategy for Engagement with Pan-African Civil Society" which supports the role of civil society in achieving Aspiration 3 of the AU Agenda 2063. The initiative is based on locally identified problems (through the Democratic Governance Initiatives, funded by the Third Party Financial Support (TPFS) (see AC2), joining initiatives across borders. Administrative processes will be accompanied by ad hoc networks, allowing CSOs to connect with progressive forces, and to have regional legitimacy while supporting national actions.

The initiative starts from the assumption that any attempt to use the ACDEG effectively requires more evidence based on the challenges of both implementing the ACDEG in AU member states and involving civic initiatives in continental AGA structures and national democratic processes (Output 1). Democratic Governance Initiatives" (DGI) are a central element of this project and will be implemented through "Third Party Financial Support" (TPFS), placing national activities at the centre of implementation and promoting local ownership. In this context, citizen technology monitoring activities are initiated, accelerated or expanded at national and continental level (Output 2). Using the data and resources generated by these initiatives, a citizen engagement campaign, which uses creative and digital formats to reach the general public across Africa, is launched and supported (Output 3). bringing citizens and decision-makers closer together, virtual spaces for debate and dialogue between citizens, civil society organisations, in particular youth civic initiatives, and AGA bodies on democratic governance issues are strengthened (Output 4) and consolidated through constructive engagement - virtual and face-to-face - between civil society organisations, national decision-makers, as well as AU decision-makers (Output 6). Cross-cuttingly, the capacity of civil society organisations, particularly youth civic initiatives, to adopt data-driven digital tools and engage with AU structures in a politically savvy manner is increased (Output 5). All outcomes contribute at different levels to IO1 (strengthened civic and youth
initiatives) and IO2 (increased collaboration between the AU, national policymakers and CSOs) and, through them, the outcome of a strong civil society across Africa on issues of democratic governance.
IV

TERAL: SELF-FINANCING INSTRUMENT OF GOREE INSTITUTE
IV. TERAL: Instrument d’autofinancement du Gorée Institute

The TERAL department of Gorée Institute is the Institute’s self-financing instrument, allowing it to reduce its dependence on financial partners. By facilitating conferences, seminars and training workshops for external institutions and organisations, it provides Gorée Institute with part of its income while consolidating its vision of a self-sufficient, peaceful and prosperous Africa.

In 2020, the impact of the health crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic on the business tourism sector did not spare TERAL, with the closure of land and airport borders, as well as the restrictive measures taken by the administrative authorities against the island of Gorée, which led to an unprecedented crisis on local tourism with the closure of tourist sites, hotels and restaurants. These measures have severely affected TERAL, which has been forced to cancel several of its events. Thus, during the whole year 2020, TERAL only registered six (6) activities and welcomed about 150 people.

However, despite the crisis that has shaken the department, the emphasis has been placed on the maintenance and repair of its infrastructure, but also and above all on the training of TERAL staff.

For the year 2021, the TERAL department is planning to set up a Training Centre of Excellence.
V. Financial Statements

Period: From 1st January 2020 to 31st December 2020

Exchange rate 1 Euro = 655.957 FCFA

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VI

PERSPECTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
VI. Perspectives and institutional challenges

Several processes to increase impact, performance and visibility are already underway and support the achievement of the goals that make Gorée Institute mission-driven and resilient. These include:

- The implementation of the Power of Dialogue Programme 2021-2025
- The implementation of the Charter Project Africa 2021-2023
- The capitalisation of the outcomes of previous projects carried out in 2019-2020.
- We will continue to work to improve the Regional Strategic Plan 2021-2025 with specific and clear regional objectives, milestones and indicators that can be used as a framework for regional activities and fundraising.
- Work towards mutuality, so that each partner brings skills, resources, knowledge and capacity in a spirit of self-reliance to our strategic partnerships
- We are reviewing our monitoring and evaluation processes to ensure greater visibility of the outcomes of our work.
- Updating our strategy to highlight the impact of fundraising (must-show vs nice-to-show).
- We will continue to strengthen our capitalisation, communication and advocacy effort, including the launch of a visual identity, website and periodic newsletter.
- Institutional strengthening through continuous improvement of more sustained business processes
PARTNERS IN 2020
VII. Partners in 2020

In 2020, partnerships with various organisations have enabled Gorée Institute to work on a variety of short and long-term projects. Gorée Institute is a member of two consortia, namely the Power of Dialogue (PoD) and the Charter Project Africa (CPA). PoD is a multi-annual programme (2021-2025) under the Power of Voices (PoV) grant from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A programme led by a consortium of four organisations, namely the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), Gorée Institute, the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies (CEMI) and Akina Mama Wa Afrika (AMwA).

The Charter Project Africa is funded by the European Union for the period 2021 - 2023 and implemented by a consortium composed of the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECPDM), Gorée Institute, the Democracy Works Foundation (DWF), Code for Africa and Africativists.

The partnership with OSIWA in the framework of the Citizen Synergy Programme for Peaceful and Credible Elections in Senegal is ongoing, as is the partnership with the Ford Foundation on Mineral Resource Governance.

With the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), a global network of civil society organisations working in the field of conflict prevention, Gorée Institute acts as a facilitator in its global action programme.

- NIMD
- OSIWA
- GPPAC
- GGA
- FORD FOUNDATION
- HUMANITY UNITED
- EPD
VIII PUBLICATIONS
VIII. Publications

With the COVID-19 pandemic restricting physical activity in 2020, Goree Institute took the opportunity to further its research, which resulted in the publication of several books:

- **Documents**

  For the Institute, documentation is crucial in the policy of popularising the many achievements obtained in its various activities. Thus, all the actions carried out in our programmes and projects have resulted in the production of analytical notes, outcomes or articles.

- **crepea.goreeinstitut.org**

  As part of its Citizen Synergy Project for Peaceful and Credible Elections in Africa, Gorée Institute has set up a Virtual Resource and Documentation Centre on electoral processes in Africa (crepea.goreeinstitut.org). This virtual resource and documentation centre represents a place of information and orientation. It is implemented with a view to meet the information needs of
students, researchers, civil society actors and, more generally, all citizens of the world. For, every citizen has a responsibility in the management of public affairs and a well-informed people remain the best lever for the emergence of our societies. The choice of a virtual centre is in line with the trend towards digitalization in our era, but also with the need for quick and easy access to information. The documents made available to the public are for example: electoral codes, codes of conduct, electoral laws, election observers’ guides, a lexicon of electoral terms, books on topics related to the electoral process, etc.

- **Goreena.org**

As part of its Mineral Resources Governance Project, Gorée Institute, through its Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Programme, has set up a technological platform called Goreena.org. This is a database designed to facilitate access to information and reliable data on the governance of the mineral and oil resources sector, including the outputs of the project, as well as documentation on regulations in the field, such as contracts and scientific and technical information.

At the same time, the Goreena.org platform offers a section dedicated to actors in the governance of mineral resources and a mapping aimed at listing all stakeholders (institutions, public companies, private sector, technical and financial partners, civil society and NGOs).

- **Communications & Informations**

Communication contributes to a large extent to the Institute's mission. It helps to publicise its values, refine its image, increase its activities and create or strengthen its relations with its various partners. Indeed, the Institute’s communication strategy is based on two types of communication: internal communication, which concerns exchanges of information between staff members, and external communication, which concerns exchanges of information with the outside world.

Indeed, thanks to effective internal communication, individual work and collaboration between staff members is strengthened, as is the link between Gorin team and the members of the Board of Directors. Ongoing communication within the staff allows for the review of all documents and the availability of internal communication tools (drive, calendar, WhatsApp, Outlook). In addition, regular and effective exchanges are noted within the staff through staff meetings, WhatsApp groups and dynamic postings.

There is also timely sharing of information through minutes, newsletters, finances, reports and exchanges on institutional matters. Communication between management and Board members also engages the latter strategically in the management of the organisation.

While internally, the guidelines for weekly results-oriented staff meetings have made it possible to organise meetings and coordination between staff more effectively, receptive communication is noted externally with attractive and concise publications, the attractiveness of our new website, media coverage of GORIN’s activities, newsletters (Goree Update, ACCESS), briefing notes, analysis notes or policy briefs published and disseminated after each activity.

Furthermore, external communication increases the levels of external interest and support for the Institute’s work by enhancing visibility and credibility at national, regional and international levels. The Institute’s information platforms and products provide visibility and credibility, as well as effective media coverage, enabling the Institute to strengthen its partnership and networking capacity and to gain support and recognition for its work among the public and decision-makers.
• Multimedia / Digital

The Institute’s information media (logo, editorial line, design and printing of publications) ensure its visibility and reinforce its credibility. In order to disseminate its news and achievements in an effective way and, at the same time, boost its credibility, the Institute has developed various information media such as the website and platforms.

Indeed, the Organisation has a regularly updated website with an attractive and diversified homepage (articles, images, graphics, videos) and specialised platforms. All of these communication channels linked to institutional projects are designed to be accessible and transparent, with a focus on key events. Websites and platforms are associated with social networks which, in turn, serve as extension relays. In addition to the website’s homepage, Gorée Institute publishes simultaneously on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Youtube, generating significant public and partner engagement.

The media strategy designed and implemented at local, regional and international level enables a strong partnership with the press. This provides the Institute with additional channels to disseminate its statements and press releases before, during and after its workshops, activities or events.

• Audiovisual production

Given the importance of capitalisation in terms of videos, the Institute relies heavily on audiovisual production with the design followed by the production of documentary films after each activity for the promotion, audience and impact of institutional actions. It is important to note, however, that the quantity of audiovisual production is far greater than the frequency of activities, because outside of these activities, a significant number of productions are carried out within the framework of the Mineral Resources Governance Project, but also in the context of Gorée Institute’s publication dissemination policy.
IX. Conseil d’administration

The Board meeting was held on 15 July 2020 with the presence of members Ayo OBE, Ambassador Saidou Nourou BA, Ambassador Hatem ATTALAH, Ambassador Bruno ZIDOUEMBA and Andy Wynne. Indeed, the health context being unfavourable to a physical meeting, the annual meeting of the Board of Directors was held online via the ZOOM Room software. The Board validated the current projects, the revised budget for 2020, as well as the financial report for 2020.
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